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COMPARATIVE LAW
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE. By A. V. Sheehan. Edin-
burgh: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975. Pp. 228.
Reviewed by Mirjan Damaska*
This is a modest book, actually a preliminary to a truly compara-
tive study of Scottish and French criminal procedure: the reader is
offered a parallel description of the two systems, along with basic
information about the various categories of institutional personnel in-
volved in the administration of criminal justice in the respective two
countries. Comparative law requires more than this parallel presen-
tation. If a book-keeping metaphor is permitted, compiling credits
and debits will not do. There must also be a balancing of accounts.
It is for this reason that the book's subtitle, "a comparative study,"
makes a false promise.
Let us review the parallel presentation. Its most obvious charac-
teristic is its synoptic ambition: the reader is offered a panoramic
view. It is equally clear that the author has no interpretative or
theoretical aspirations: an almost exclusive photographic realism is
attempted. The product is a monochrome of legal detail. This snap-
shot will seem quite normal for those from highly formalistic legal
cultures, but seems to lack depth for those with the current taste for
the cultural location of legal themes. Within these narrow limits the
book under review is quite valuable.
The first part of the book deals with the French criminal process,
an alien system to the author. Struggling to find a proper counter-
weight to his native understanding of the practical functioning of
Scottish criminal procedure, the author obviously took great pains to
inform himself about the actual enforcement of criminal laws in
France. There are frequent and welcome departures from black letter
law and institutional ideology, especially in the book's treatment of
the police state and of the relationship between public prosecutor and
investigating judge. Nevertheless the presentation does not compare
in practical insight to the account of the author's native system. Con-
trast for instance the clear and insightful portrayal of Scottish police
interrogations (p. 134 ff.) with the treatment of its French counter-
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part. In both situations, one suspects, essentially identical phenomena
are involved, leading to similar tensions and possible evasive practices:
the police, representing the "id" of the criminal justice system with its
need for information, struggle with the system's "super ego" as repre-
sented by the legislative and judicial constraints on the manner of
obtaining information. It would probably serve as a provocative par-
allel to the present Scottish police practice-which proceeds praeter
legem-if the author had included in his presentation a brief historical
account of the now defunct enquete officieuse.
Notwithstanding the possible lack of balance with the second part
of the book, embracing what to the author is materia propinqua, the
synoptic description of the French process teems with useful infor-
mation. Its main novelty however resides in a very skillful organisa-
tion of the material, laced with eloquent illustrations, for the cognitive
needs of the reader. The same applies to the useful appendices with
practical examples, as well as to sporadic, quite revealing statistics.
Of much greater interest is the succinct insider's report on the
operation of the Scottish system which comprises Part Two. Orienta-
tion and the contrasting of procedural arrangements are facilitated by
a comprehensive table of contents, logically structured and rigorously
symmetrical for the two countries. Together with strategically placed
cross-references, the table greatly compensates for the astonishing
absence of an index, so important for a book with informational
aspirations. Many useful data remain' hard to retrieve however. How
is one to expect for instance that the French law on extradition is
tucked under a description of the chambre d'accusation?
As the author shuns theory, the weaker points in the book are
naturally those sporadic passages devoted to themes from which
conceptual analysis cannot completely be exorcised. These passages
are deceptively simple, possibly even misleading. Consider the auth-
or's handling of themes such as the presumption of innocence, onus of
proof, or appeals in France. Wrongly r think, the equivalence of the
legal vocabularies in the two countries has been assumed. There is
also no intimation of the various possible meanings these terms can
assume, of their subtly divergent accents, perhaps even their discrep-
ant affective colorations. It is probably due to these reasons that a
few isolated passages may quite easily mislea,d the reader. In what
sense can one say that the French refuse to admit hearsay (p. 28)?
Is it true that French' appeals must concern a point of procedure
(p. 92)? It is true however that a panoramic snapshot with few, if
any, theoretical shadings, should not be judged on the basis of such
sporadic passages. As Voltaire has suggested, one should not be con-
victed for the good things one has not attempted. Emphasis on such
minutiae as specific items to be included in legal documents clearly
shows that the author's primary intention was to provide the legal
profession with a practically-oriented manual. In this he has largely
succeeded and even displayed a certain mastery of surfaces.
To the scholar the part devoted to the Scottish system is much
the more interesting, and may even prove to be an unexpected mine
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of unusual, hybrid procedural arrangements. It is true that the gen-
eral etiology of this hybridization it l'ecossaise is well known. It has
been studied mainly on the private law side however, in connection
with the influence of the pre-codification continental law on the
Scottish legal system. In the less familiar administration of criminal
justice, continental carryovers, while not so common, are perhaps all
the more striking, because the Scots have largely escaped the experi-
ence of a strong, centralized state, so important a shaper of European
institutions. Let me single out a few curious "collages" resulting from
the commingling of the continental and common law procedural
idioms.
On the level of institutional structures, one finds in Scotland an
unusual pastiche of continental "bureau.cratic" ideas with the tradi-
tional common law institutions. The ultimate French inspiration of
the office of the Scottish public prosecutor is unmistakable, notwith-
standing the fact that the office was centralized only after the wave of
continental influence had long subsided. The prosecutorial organiza-
tion manifests all the essential attributes of a hierarchical bureaucratic
institution. Its powers are quite surprising in view of the dominance
of common law features in the total system. For instance, it is the
prosecutor who decides whether a case will be tried to a judge or to
a jury. The significance of this decision is far-reaching. As there
are no appeals from jury acquittals but there is such possibility follow-
ing trials to a judge, it is the prosecutor who decides whether there will
be a possibility to correct "false negatives." Nor is this the most
important consequence. Since the punishment for many offenses is
not fixed by law, the maximum penalty will frequently depend on
the maximum powers given to the court in which the crime is tried.
Now, as the prosecutor can choose the court, he can ipso facto deter-
mine the ceiling of the penalty that can be imposed in the case at
bar. As on the Continent, so in Scotland, the prosecutor is expected
to be impartial (a quasi-judicial attitude), and there seems in fact
to be far less agonistic confrontation between the prosecution and the
defense than in America.
While the prosecutorial arm in Scotland thus displays affinities
with its continental counterpart, the judiciary is of the classic common
law type. Judges are selected from among prominent members of the
Bar, with all the usual consequences this entails for the judicial sensi-
bility. Naturally there is virtually no interchange between the judi-
cial and prosecutorial personnel, and even prosecutors with long serv-
ice are thought unsuitable for judicial office.
Turning to processing forms, the common law idiom is manifestly
decisive. There is no comprehensive pre-trial investigation with its
accompanying dossier, and the need for trial can be obviated by the
defendant's plea of guilty. As can be expected in view of the impor-
tant prosecutorial powers, the great majority of cases are disposed of
by pleas of guilty, following "plea bargaining." (See interesting
statistics on p. 119.) Nevertheless, even trial forms betray contrasting
HeinOnline -- 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 782 1976
782 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 24
common law and continental impulses. Some resulting mixtures are
curiosa, especially where the continental cosmopolitan law of the
pre-codification period still seems to survive. Two examples should
suffice in order to whet the appetite of the scholar.
Following the sixteenth~centurymetamorphoses, the common law
jury trial developed rules of proof-admissibility rather than rules of
proof-evaluation. The trial thus became tied to the formal minuet of
introducing evidence. In contrast, the continental criminal process
had developed three centuries earlier an evidentiary system with
emphasis on proof-evaluation but few, if any, admissibility rules.
Consider now the curious amalgam of Scottish law where no person
can be convicted of a crime unless there is evidence of at least two
witnesses implicating the defendant. The jury thus operates under
a system of proof-evaluation rules, coexisting with the traditional
common law emphasis on controlling the flow of information to the
jury through admissibility rules. It is true that Scottish proof-evalua-
tion rules do not dictate compulsory conviction under certain condi-
tions, as was the case on the Continent for many centuries. But these
rules preclude the possibility of conviction before the required mini-
mum of proof is adduced, establishing what may be termed a general
corroboration rule. Continental theorists used to speak here of "the
negative system of legal proof" as contrasted with its older, "positive"
variant.
This leads to the second curious feature of the Scottish criminal
procedure, the so-called verdict of not proven which exists in addition
to the verdicts of not guilty and of innocent. Attempts to trace a via
media between conviction and- acquittal are not inextricably rooted in
rules of proof-evaluation. A triad of verdicts was known already in
classical Rome in the context of jury trials free of rules concerning
the weight to be accorded to evidence. The famous Roman non liquet
verdict probably expressed the state of mind of jurors neither con-
vinced that the defendant was guilty nor persuaded that he was inno-
cent. 1 But in order to find closer analogues to the Scottish not proven
verdict one must turn to systems which espouse legal rules concerning
proof-evaluation. Continental inquisitorial procedure of the Ancien
Regime furnishes a parallel example. Already in the late thirteenth
century practice of the Italian Podesta, the judge often faced the
dilemma of what to do when the legal proof failed but he was sub-
jectively persuaded of the defendant's guilt. The dilemma turned
cosmopolitan with the transmontane dissemination of inquisitorial
procedural forms. What to do with a defendant whom the judge be-
lieved guilty (or "vehemently suspicious") although the legally re-
quired proof could not be adduced thus became one of the perennial
1. An attenuated modern form of such verdict is the contemporary Italian
judgment of acquittal "per insufficienza di prove." In the practice of some
continental countries permitting only two verdicts on the merits, the' grounds
that accompany an acquittal sometimes distinguish cases where innocence was
established from those where guilt has not been proven. This seems to be a
remote echo from the days when the middle of the road verdict still existed.
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themes of procedural literature from the days of Albertus Gandinus
until the turbulent years of the French revolution. Sometimes statu-
tory law would help in solving the dilE!mma. The famous French
Ordonnance criminelle of 1670 went so far as to distinguish three types
of acquittal. But more often than not at the mercy of scholarly author-
ity, practice wavered and hesitated between a conviction to a lesser
punishment (poena extraordinaria) and a special verdict "absolving"
the defendant from the court (absolutio ab instantia) -not to be
confused with acquittal pure and simple.
The author of the book under review does not tell us enough
about the situations in which the Scottish jury must return the not
proven verdict to enable one to compare this verdict with absolutio ab
instantia.2 Nor does my next-to-complete ignorance of the actual
historical development permit me more than to suspect that the con-
tinental pre-codification legal theory and practice may have played
a part in shaping the Scottish tertium quid. But it is one of the
luxuries of ignorance to justify us in letting our imagination loose to
wander. Let me then offer a thought on the relationship of the not
proven verdict to the cluster of values usually associated with the
presumption of innocence, against the background of my uncertainty
about the precise circumstances in which the verdict is returned in
actual practice.
A system adopting the general corroboration rule (or the negative
system of legal proof) cannot totally avoid situations in which the
adjudicator cannot legally convict, irrespective of his grave doubts
or even subjective convictions as to the defendant's guilt. He may be
persuaded by a single witness that the defendant is actually guilty,
but may disbelieve another "corroborating" witness for the prosecu-
tion. As the supporting testimony of two witnesses is required, there
cannot legally be a conviction. Now if the Scottish jury renders the
not proven verdict solely in situations where legal proof failed al-
though the majority of jurors believe that the defendant is guilty-
an unlikely hypothesis-then the verdict does not run counter to the
presumption of innocence in one of its accepted meanings. But if
the verdict is also returned in cases where, in the absence of legal
proof, jurors entertain only a suspicion that the defendant may be
guilty, then at least certain aspects of the presumption of innocence,
untouched by the author, have an uncertain status in Scottish jury
trials. All attempts at tracing a via media between a conviction and
full acquittal seem to have a dubious relationship to political values
expressed in the maxim that the defendant's innocence is presumed
in criminal procedure. For if the adjudicator is not fully convinced
of the guilt of the defendant, then the presumption has not been re-
butted, and an acquittal tout court seems to be in order.
2. We know however that the Scottish verdict does not carryall the
detrimental consequences which flowed from the "absolutio ab instantia"
(e.g. police surveillance, double jeopardy, etc.). The only difference between
a verdict of acquittal and of not proven seems to be a slur on the character of
the defendant attached to the latter verdict (p. 168).
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One could easily continue mining the peculiar procedural and
evidentiary forms presented in this book. But what I have said so
far is enough. Even rough data contained in the book stimulate the
fancy of the comparativist. They also dramatize the difficulty con-
fronting the scholar who pursues "ideal types" with the hope of organ-
izing our perception of the empirical richness of procedural arrange-
ments.
LEGAL HISTORY
PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE. ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE.
By John H. Langbein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Pp.322.
Reviewed by Thomas G. Barnes'"
Professor Langbein's monograph is very much in a class by itself:
it is the first major study of comparative English-Continental legal
history since Professor John Dawson's A History of Lay Judges (1960).
It bears comparison to the master's work, and by virtue of a more lim-
ited purview and a finer focus it succeeds in advancing our knowledge
of the institutions and structures which Dawson first brought to
our attention. Dawson's thesis, that the "active agent in driving out
lay judges in France was the Roman-canonist system of procedure,
especially its modes of investigation and proof,"! is implicitly Lang-
bein's starting point for his study of the principal legislative directives
in England, the Empire, and France in the sixteenth century institut-
ing or at least refining the process of investigation and prosecution of
crime. This is an ambitious undertaking: either the Marian statutes
on bail and committal (England, 1554-1555) or the Carolina· (Empire,
1532) or the Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterets (France, 1539) would be
enough to make a worthy book. The author's choice of an avowedly
comparative method is admirable. He recognizes the hazards; some
unevenness in depth of treatment is inevitable, for as Langbein points
out "the French have left their enormous resources of archive material
largely unworked" with consequent problems for the "foreign com-
parativist" (211). Despite the hazards (and the shortcomings) the
effort was worth it, because the comparative approach reveals dis-
similarities in the prosecutorial and investigative modes of the three
systems much more than similarities and consequently reveals the
existence of a common problem solved by uncommon means. Any
nail driven into the coffin of that peculiarly academic, nineteenth-
century Whiggish intellectual contrivance called "The Reception" is
• Professor of History & Law, University of California, Berkeley.
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